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(1) Negligence-lack of evidence to support the contention.
(2) Express Warranty-unsupported by assignments of error.
(3) Implied Warranty of Fitness-lack of reliance on the seller's skill or judgment
as required by RCW 63.04.160 (1), and doubt as to whether the transaction was
a sale.
The court, in discussing whether there was a sale of goods within the meaning of
RCW 63.04.020, stated the transaction was a "public service contract." What
analytical value this label has was not made clear. The court relied on Cornelius v.
City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 213 Pac. 17 (1923). This case decided a garbage purchase was a public service contract for the purpose of determining whether garbage
transactions were the proper subject of the exercise of a city's police power. This
holding appears to have little bearing on the instant sales question. A holding that
a transaction is subject to regulation under the police power is not inconsistent with a
holding that a similar transaction is a sale.
The garbage appears to be a by-product of a portion of the Sanatorium's businessthat of feeding patients and personnel-and as such, a proper subject of a sales
transaction. The consideration for the sale was the plaintiff's forty dollar monthly payment plus his service to the defendant which consisted of removing the garbage from
the Sanatorium. If, as the court says, the transaction is questionable, the writer feels
it should not be questioned in terms of "public service" as defined in the Corntelius case.

TAXATION
Distraint and Sale-Adequacy of Notice. Two problems are discussed in this note. The first is whether or not the court applied the
proper statute in the recent case of Metzger v. Quick.' The second
problem is whether or not the construction accorded the statute by
the court would violate the doctrine of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co.2
In Metzger v. Quick, the plaintiff's personal property consisting of
sawmill equipment was sold for taxes which had been levied, but were
not yet due, and taxes which were delinquent. The county treasurer
elected to make a distraint of the personalty.' A notice was posted on
the premises and in two public places.' Although not required by the
statute under which the treasurer was proceeding,5 a registered letter
was mailed to the last known address of the plaintiff. The letter was
returned marked "unclaimed." Ten days after the posting of the
notices of distraint and sale the property was sold.' The plaintiff
1 46 Wn2d 477, 282 P.2d
2 339 U.S. 306 (1949).

812 (1955).

3 Among other defenses set up by the defendant was one that he was acting pursuant
to RCW 84.56.100-.110. The writer considers it to be relatively unimportant in the
light of the majority opinion.
4 RCW 84.56.070. "He [the county treasurer] shall advertise the sale by posting
written notices in three public places."
5 RCW 84.56.070 provides only for posting.
6 RCW 84.56.070 provides that "... such sale, which shall not be less than ten days
after the taking of such property."
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alleged the reasonable value of the property to be in excess of $15,000.
The taxes were ascertained to be $161.44. The property was sold
for $875.
Basically, two statutes are in issue in the principal case. RCW
84.56.070, entitled "Distraint and sale for personal property taxes,"
requires the county treasurer to proceed to collect all personal property taxes, giving notice by mail that the taxes are due, and are
collectable by the treasurer if not paid. He is authorized to prepare
papers in distraint and, without notice or demand, seize sufficient goods
to pay the taxes. He is further authorized to sell the goods at a public
sale if the tax be not paid.
RCW 84.56.080 is entitled "Distraint of stationary property." It
provides for the distraint of property, such as standing timber, or
property which the treasurer should believe to be incapable, or reasonably impracticable, of manual delivery. In such instances the treasurer
must first file a notice of distraint with the county auditor, and mail a
registered letter to the taxpayer giving him notice thirty days before
any sale of that property.
Cutting across the two statutes mentioned above are RCW
84.56.090, .100, and .110, entitled "Jeopardy distraint.. ." These
provide that when the treasurer reasonably believes that property is
being removed from the state, or is being dissipated, the treasurer may
distrain without demand or notice. The difference among the three
statutes pertains to the time of distraint. The times for action are:
after tax is due, after levy, and before levy.
The plaintiff's contention was that the county treasurer, having
elected to make a constructive seizure of the property, must comply
with RCW 84.56.080, which sets forth the process for distraining stationary property. He maintained that the property seized was bulky
and was also "... incapable or reasonably impracticable of manual
delivery."" The plaintiff further contended that if acting under RCW
84.56.070 (Distraint and sale for personal property taxes), the county
treasurer must either take the property into his actual possession, or
give actual notice of the distraint.'
In sustaining the trial court, the majority held that it is discretionary
upon the county treasurer to choose the manner in which he may distrain and take personalty into his possession. "... [T]o distrain per7RCW 84.56.080.
s The plaintiff relied on J. K. Lumber Co. v. Ash, 104 Wash. 388, 176 Pac. 550
(1918).
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sonal property, the county treasurers are not required by law to take
physical possession of the property."' This ruling stems from RCW
84.56.070 (Distraint and sale for personal property taxes).
In regard to the plaintiff's contention that RCW 84.56.080 was
controlling, the majority answered that this statute has given the
county treasurer the right "... to determine whether the property is
incapable or reasonably impracticable of manual delivery... and that,
therefore, it was not necessary to file the notice of distraint and sale
with the county auditor."1 The court said that the defendant did not
abuse his discretion since the plaintiff had moved the machinery up to
the mill, ".. . and it is assumed that the purchaser moved it away."'1
The majority construed RCW 84.56.070 to mean that after February 15th of each year, the treasurer shall proceed to collect all
personal property taxes. He shall give notice by mail that the taxes
are due and payable. If he is unable to collect the taxes, the treasurer
shall prepare papers in distraint, and without notice or demand distrain sufficient goods to pay for the uncollected taxes. He shall advertise the sale by posting written notices in three public places. 2
The majority relied on J.K. Lumber Co. v. Ask" and State ex rel.
Peoples National Bank v. King County.' Neither of the two cases is
exactly in point. The use of the State ex rel. PeoplesNationalBank case
was inappropriate because the validity of the distraint was not in issue."
The exact issue before the court in the Ask case' was whether a
sheriff could accomplish a valid distraint and sale by giving actual
notice and by the posting of notices at the site of the property being
distrained, or whether he must take actual possession of the property.
The property consisted of railroad tracks and rolling equipment.
The court held that the distraining official need not take the property
into his actual possession, that by posting notices and by giving the
946 Wn.2d at 483, 282 P.2d at 815.
10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 One question in the mind of the writer: need there even be a notice posted on the
premises in order to satisfy the majority?
"1 104 Wash. 388, 176 Pac. 550 (1918).

'4 36 Wn2d 10, 216 P.2d 225 (1950).

25 The Peoples National Bank case involved a mortgage held by the respondent on
certain machinery and office furniture. A distraint was levied for unpaid taxes; the
mortgage-holder tendered the amount due on the property covered by the mortgage.
The issue was the superiority of liens. It was held that the mortgage was prior to the
lien raised by the distraint. In 36 Wn2d at 11 the court said, "Appellants levied a distraint ...
." At page 14 reference is made to a lien. There appears no indication as to
whether there was an actual seizure, a constructive seizure, notice, or no notice. See
Brief of Respondents, pp. 17-19, and Reply Brief of Appellants, pp. 12-13 of Metzger v.

Quick.
16

Note 12 supra.
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plaintiff actual notice he had complied with the statute.
Note that RCW 84.56.080 (Distraint of stationary property) was
passed and amended in 1933'" and that the Ash case was decided in
1918. The Ash case should have been construed in light of the later
passage of RCW 84.56.080 in those instances in which a constructive
seizure of personal property is involved.
The writer prefers the opinion of the minority as a more cogent
analysis of that portion of the code dealing with distraints. The
minority maintains that RCW 84.56.070 is applicable to a physical
seizure or distraint of property, and that RCW 84.56.080 pertains to
constructive seizure or distraint. Therefore, these two statutes provide
for the two basic types of distraint, as well as spelling out how the
distraints may be made. An exception would be if actual notice were
given the taxpayer.
The minority maintains that RCW 84.56.070 (Distraint and sale
for personal property taxes), supplemented by RCW 84.56.090, .100,
and .110 (the jeopardy distraint statutes), provides the basic occasions
for distraint. The theory of the minority was that, where all property is
presumably in the possession of its owner, actual seizure by tax officials
imparts notice.' Posting of notices, or constructive seizure, does not
so convincingly support a presumption of notice as does actual seizure."
This distinction, says the minority, was recognized by the legislature
in the enactment of RCW 84.56.080 (Distraint of stationary property). The minority concludes that if a county treasurer utilizes a
constructive seizure, although making a jeopardy distraint, he must
comply with RCW 84.56.080 (Distraint of stationary property) in
order to make a lawful distraint.
Present in cases of this type is the problem of three policies which
demand reconciliation: the state's need for revenue,"0 the need to
7 See Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wn2d 390 at 399, 191 P.2d 858 at 863 (1948),
wherein the principle is set forth that a legislative body is presumed to be familiar with
prior court decisions relating to a statutory enactment.
"8See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
70 Cf. McAllister, Taxpayers' Rentedies-Washington Property Taxes, 13 WAsH. L.
Ra,. 91 at 99 (1938). "The county treasurer collects the tax out of the proceeds and
pays any balance to the owner. In all this the taxpayer has had personal notice that a
tax in a certain amount was due, but beyond that he has had no personal notice. The
notice of sale is merely published." See also: Eldridge, Property Tax Collection Procedure in WVashington, 17 WAsH. L. REV. 123 (1942).
20 See Commercial Waterway District No. 1 of King County v. King County, 197
Wash. 441, 85 P.2d 1067 (1938) to the effect that the power of taxation is an essential
and basic attribute of sovereignty, and that the receipt of money from general taxation
is necessary to the support of the state. See also State v. Allen, 2 McCord 55 (S.C.
1822).
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protect the tax collecting servants,2 and the need to protect the rights
of the taxpayer. 2 The majority holding can afford little protection of
the taxpayer's rights.
At present, a situation seemingly exists in which a distraint may
be made by constructive seizure, but the statute which spells out the
process whereby stationary property, or property which is reasonably
impracticable of manual delivery, is to be distrained may be ignored,
except for those specific categories set forth in RCW 84.56.080 (Distraint of stationary property). Thus, neither actual notice of the
impending sale, nor the constructive thirty-day notice called for in
RCW 84.56.080 (Distraint of stationary property), need be given the
taxpayer. There may be no opportunity for the taxpayer to pay his
taxes and redeem his property.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,"
2 a United States
Supreme Court decision, appears to threaten the majority's construction of RCW 84.56.070 (Distraint and sale for personal property
taxes). The underlying principle in the Mullane case is that, as to
known persons whose rights are to be accorded finality in any respect,
the best notice possible under the circumstances must be given.2 4 In
the holding of the Mullane case, the best notice possible as to known
persons is actual notice or notice by mail. To those persons whose
whereabouts or identities were unknown, notice by posting, publication
or seizure would be sufficient.
The scope of the Mullane case has not as yet been determined.25
Two cases, decided on the Mullane case, have come before the
Supreme Court,"6 and one before the Washington Supreme Court.
21 See Spaulding v. Adams County, 79 Wash. 193, 140 Pac. 367 (1914), wherein the
court maintains that tax statutes have been liberally interpreted, and that the actions of
taxing officials are upheld in all cases where the substance and spirit of the statute has
been pursued, although there may have been a departure from the strict letter of the
statute.
See Morgan v. Larson, 183 Wash. 287, 48 P.2d 621 (1935). The court says that
regard must be had for the rights of taxpayers in spite of the fact that the sale of
personal property is summary to the highest degree. See also Wilberg v. Yakima
County, 132 Wash. 219, 213 Pac. 931 (1925).
22339 U.S. 306 (1949). Here, the trustee of a common-trust fund filed a petition
for settlement as required by statute. It was held that, as to known persons, the lack
of a requirement of personal service by the statute did not comply with "due process."
See Fraser, Jurisdictionby Necessty-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L.

Ray. 305 (1951) ; Notes, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Company Upon Piublication of Notice in. Iowa, 36 IowA L. REv. 47 (1950) ; 5 MIAmI
L. Q. 153 (1950) ; 25 WAsH. L. Rxv. 282 (1950).
24 339 U.S. at 314.
25 Cf. Pierce v. Hildebrand, 103 F. Supp. 396, 399 (S.D. Iowa 1952)
(dictum).
"...
[W]e anticipate much in time will be said to delimit Mullane."
26 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1950) ; City of New York v. New
York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1952).
27 New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wn.2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953).
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As to known persons, the problem is whether Mullane could be
properly applied to the construction of a statute which requires no
notice, other than posting, of a distraint and sale. The constitutional
violation would fall under the "due process" clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution.2 8
Courts have tended to categorize distraint and sale as one in the
nature of an action or proceeding in rem with no convincing argument
as to why it is in rem." This need not prove to be an impassible barrier.
The court in the Mullane case was careful not to decide whether they
were faced with a problem in rem or in personam. Thus, it is suggested
that perhaps the labels, in rem and in personam, may not be weighed
as heavily as they once were.30
Analytically, it is possible to construe the proceeding in the instant
case to be one in personam. Thus, if the object of an action be one
to enforce a power over a particular res, then the action may be
classified as one in rem. If the object of the action be one to enforce
a personal liability, that is, to secure damages and thus get at the
property of a determinate person or number of persons generally, then
the action may be classified as one in personam.3"
The motive or object of the state in distraining property should be
to secure payment of taxes, that is, to secure damages. To attribute
the motive or object sought to be that of a sale alone, would be to
cast the state in the anomalous role of ignoring the interest of its
citizen in the res.
Seizure, posting or publication usually is not sufficient in in personam
proceedings. Generally, more is required in the nature of notice. 2
Since actual notice, or something approaching actual notice, is
required in in personam actions, the fatal weakness in the construction of RCW 84.56.070 would seem manifest. The majority, in the
principal case, said, "The legislature saw fit to specifically waive notice
28 U.S.
29

CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

People v. Skinner, 18 Cal2d 349, 115 P2d 488 (1941). See Puget Sound Power
and Light Co. v. Cowlitz County, 38 Wn2d 907, 234 P2d 506 (1951) wherein the court,
in an opinion none too candid, discounts the debt theory of personal liability for personal
property taxes. Contra, Raymond v. King County, 117 Wash. 343, 201 Pac. 455 (1921) ;
Wilberg v. Yakima County, 132 Wash. 219, 231 Pac. 931 (1925). See 1 COOLEY, TAXATION § 24 (4th ed. 1924).
Categorized as a proceeding in invitum. Independent School District No. 39, Creek
County v. National Exchange Co., 164 Okla. 176, 23 P.2d 210 (1933).
Compare Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover, 2 Wn.2d 162, 97 P.2d 628
(1940) (land), with Anderson v. Daugherty, 169 Ky. 308, 133 S.W. 545 (1916) (land).
3n 339 U.S. at 312.

-3 Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COLUm. L. Rxv. 37, 106, 288 (1915).
Attention is drawn particularly to page 49.
32 Note

23, supra.
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of distraint when it provided that '... he [the treasurer) shall without
demand or notice distrain...' If notice of distraint is desired, the
legislature must provide for it."33 This holding would appear inconsistent with that of the Mullane case.
The weakness inherent in the above analysis may be found in
Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. Cowlitz County. 4 There, the
court held a tax on personal property not to be a personal obligation.
However, the writer believes that the true nature of a distraint and
sale, in so far as an action is concerned, is one in personam.
Other theories exist which could be utilized by the courts to achieve
a more just result than that of the principal case.
Note should be taken that statutes once thought sacrosanct have
either fallen or have been changed to conform to the Mullane case.3"
In conclusion, the courts should recognize that where inadequate
notice is afforded by statute the end result is an unjust forfeiture and a
form of legalized larceny. The Mullane case should be read and
applied in its most literal terms. Finally, if analytically it is not possible to construe the Mullane case as requiring actual notice, where
feasible, common decency should require more than the antiquated
procedure of notice by posting or publication."
GEORGE O'DEA
Incidence of State Inheritance Tax-Time of Vesting of Real Property and
Income. In Clark v. Nash, 46 Wn.2d 401, 281 P2d 857 (1955), the testator devised
specific income property to the respondent and bequeathed and devised the residue to
others, ". . after payment of all of my just debts, taxes, and costs of administration."
The trial court was reversed in its holding that the respondent took free from the
state inheritance tax. Pursuant to RCW 83.08.060, any intention to provide that a
bequest be made free and clear of any claim of taxes must be made in the will. "A mere
statement that the testator desires his taxes to be paid does not clearly express an
intention to charge his estate with taxes imposed by law upon a beneficiary." Clear
and express language must be used in order to obviate a similar controversy.
The court also construed RCW 11.04.250 to mean that ... real property and the
right to receive the income therefrom vest in the devisee as of the death of the
decedent, subject only to the trusteeship of the executor during the probate of the
estate."
33 282 P.2d at 816. It should be noted that the litigants argued the case on the
analogy of similarity to a levy and attachment proceeding, but this argument was
ignored by the court.
34 38 Wn.2d 907, 234 P.2d 506 (1951).
3r RCW 11.76.040 (1955 c 205 § 13). This statute now provides that written notice
must be provided each heir or distributee. Cf. Mulhern v. Gerold, 116 F.Supp. 22 (D.
Mass. 1953). Pagni v. Commonwealth, 179 Pa. Super. 213, 116 A.2d 294 (1955).
36 The advisory committee comment on IowA R. Crv. P., p. 369 states, "Notice by
posting had its place and probably accomplished its purpose, before the days of newspapers, crowded cities and improved facilities for communication. Realistically it has
long been archaic so far as accomplishing any function, other than adherence to
ancient traditions is concerned."

